The ability to access and combine bits of knowledge and information from different industries is an important channel through which firms innovate and create value. These bits of knowledge and information refer to, for example, manufacturing processes, organizational routines, and governance mechanisms. We argue that these bits flow across the network of customer-supplier relationships, and that this diffusion mechanism provides a competitive advantage to firms that are more centrally located in this network. We test this hypothesis using a twofold identification strategy: (i) we proxy for the customer-supplier network using input-output inter-industry trade flows; and (ii) we focus our analysis on conglomerates, in order to control for unobserved industry heterogeneity. First, we find that conglomerates with higher excess centrality-a network measure of informational advantage relative to specialized firms-have greater industry-adjusted Tobin's Q and accounting profitability. Second, in a sample of mergers that change conglomerates' network positions, an increase in excess centrality generates higher announcement stock returns. Third, we find evidence that higher R&D productivity and lower investment distortions are two potential mechanisms through which high-excess-centrality conglomerates create value. 
Introduction
Having access to different sources of knowledge, along with the ability to recombine this knowledge, is an important determinant of a firm's innovative success (Burt, 2004 (Burt, , 2005 .
1
The contents of this knowledge can range from technical aspects of manufacturing processes to complex governance mechanisms. This view of the firm as a technological or knowledge broker is illustrated by the following passage in Hargadon (2003) :
By working in a range of different industries or markets, firms are in a better position to see when the people, ideas, and objects of one world can be combined in new ways to solve the problems of another.
The benefits of knowledge brokering are illustrated by Henry Ford's invention of the assembly line, which partially stemmed from his observations on the sewing-machine and meatpacking industries. Another example is the development of color paints for automobiles in the 1920's by DuPont, a direct application of a product the firm was initially developing for the photography industry. More recently, the success of Silicon Valley high-tech firms is partly credited to their access to the extensive knowledge and experience of law firms and venture capitalists who had been working in other industries.
2
Despite the evidence for the role that technology and knowledge brokering plays in a company's ability to innovate, it is unclear if firms pursuing these strategies create value. Firms may pursue innovation strategies to serve personal ambitions of managers and/or engineers, with disregard for shareholder's interests. Also, if the documented cases of success are simply rare events with high visibility, one should be cautious in deriving positiveand especially normative-implications of being exposed to a wide knowledge base. This skepticism is the basic motivation for our paper, where we do find that firms create value on average by strategically diversifying in order to access knowledge and information.
To address our research question we rely on a fundamental assumption, namely that a key channel through which firms gain awareness of potentially valuable bits of knowledge and information is via customer-supplier relationships (as suggested in, e.g., Gulati, 1999 and McEvily and Marcus, 2005) , with Toyota being a paradigmatic example (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Dyer and Hatch, 2006) . We further argue that since firms are embedded in a network of customer-supplier relationships, knowledge and information will be diffused across the customer-supplier network, and so firms that are positioned centrally in this network will have an informational advantage and thus perform better, ceteris paribus.
1 A standard argument for the benefits of accessing disparate knowledge is that it allows firms to avoid what organizational theorists designate as competency traps arising from specialization (March, 1991) .
2 All three examples are from Hargadon (2003) .
To test our centrality hypothesis we ideally would measure all inter-firm trade flows and build an economy-wide firm-level network. Unfortunately, such detailed data is not available and so we proxy the customer-supplier network at the industry level, using inter-industry commodity flows from the 1997 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis Input-Output tables.
3 An immediate approach to testing the centrality hypothesis would then be to investigate whether firms operating in more central industries display systematically higher performance. However, unobservable industry characteristics can potentially be simultaneously correlated with network position and measures of economic performance, producing spurious results. 4 Given these endogeneity concerns, we adopt an identification strategy where we use cross-sectional and time-series variation in the position of conglomerates in the network of industries, and we link that variation to industry-adjusted economic performance. Such identification strategy allows us to control for industry-specific effects and focus on the centrality of conglomerates in excess of the centrality of specialized firms. A key feature of our approach is that we depict conglomerates as performing a kind of informational arbitrage in the network of industries, by combining potentially non-redundant information sets from each of their participated segments. Borrowing Hargadon's characterization of firms as "technology brokers", we view conglomerates as firms where technology brokering is a strategic priority. The prototypical example of a conglomerate, General Electric, fits this description nicely, as illustrated by the following passage from the 2003 annual report:
In key industries-healthcare, transportation, energy, and retail-the challenges are multidimensional. With its long experience in these industries and its diverse set of businesses, GE can offer multifaceted solutions.
We propose and construct a novel measure at the conglomerate level-we term it excess centrality-that captures the extent to which the technological information set of the conglomerate is larger than the information sets of specialized firms operating in the industries where the conglomerate is present. To illustrate the rationale behind this measure, consider a conglomerate that participates in two segments that are close in the network of industries. Then the conglomerate's contribution as a technological broker will be small, since specialized firms in these two industries are probably already having access to the same sources of knowledge and information. On the other hand, if a conglomerate combines segments that have access to distinct sources of information, then it has the potential to add significant value. We note however that a strategy that maximizes informational non-redundancy is 3 Examples of other research in finance using the input-output matrix are Fan and Lang (2000) or, more recently, Ahern and Harford (2010) . 4 For completeness sake we report regression results of value on industry centrality in the online appendix.
in general not equivalent to simply combining the most distant segments, but may rather involve a mixture of central and peripheral industries (this is detailed in section 2). The independence between excess centrality and segment distance allows us to differentiate our story from arguments based on financial advantages associated with coinsurance effects. The latter would presumably be larger for firms participating in more distant (i.e. less correlated) businesses. First we test the hypothesis that conglomerates with greater informational competitive advantage from a more central positioning in the network of industries command a higher market valuation, relative to other conglomerates that are not as centrally located. We follow closely the methodology applied in most diversification studies (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Villalonga, 2004; Santalo and Becerra, 2008; Custódio, 2009 ) and compute each conglomerate's excess value, the log-difference between the conglomerate's Tobin's Q and the Tobin's Q of a similar portfolio of specialized firms (the "artificial conglomerate"). We hasten to add that although we employ a methodology that is very popular in the diversification literature, we do not take a stand in terms of the size or direction of the diversification premium/discount, since our approach is based on cross-sectional and time-series differences amongst conglomerates.
5
Using the excess centrality and excess value variables for a large sample of conglomerates from 1990 to 2008, we find that excess centrality is positively related to excess value, even after controlling for other conglomerate characteristics: conglomerates with an excess centrality one-standard-deviation greater than the mean have a firm value that is 3% greater than the average conglomerate. This represents 20% of the diversification discount in Berger and Ofek (1995) . Our results hold even if we add conglomerate fixed effects to our regressions: conglomerates that increase their informational advantage in the network (excess centrality) over time experience an economically and statistically significant increase in market value. We complement the excess-value analysis by looking at the effects of excess centrality on excess profitability, the difference between each conglomerate's return on assets and the return on assets of a similar portfolio of specialized firms. We find that high excess centrality predicts high future excess profitability, and that it takes on average about two years for this effect to become visible.
Even after controlling for conglomerate fixed effects, time-varying omitted variables could still drive and bias our results. To address this issue, we look at the stock price reaction upon announcement of a merger that changes the excess centrality of an acquirer. Using a 3-day 5 The literature has been somewhat ambiguous with respect to the existence of a discount associated with diversification in general. Earlier studies find sizable discounts (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995) , but more recent research suggests this is either an artifact of selection biases or measurement errors (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Schoar, 2002; Villalonga, 2004; Custódio, 2009). window around the announcement date allows us to cleanly measure the effect on firm value of a sudden shock to the position of a conglomerate in the network of industries. We find that mergers that increase a firm's excess centrality generate higher stock price abnormal announcement returns for the acquiring firm. One of the contributions of the paper is to stress that not all mergers are equal, and mergers that are a good strategic fit (i.e. increase excess centrality significantly) create value for shareholders.
Our hypothesis and results beg the question of why not all conglomerates maximize excess centrality. First, frictions stop conglomerates from fully diversifying. In a frictionless world, all companies should be present in all industries, in order to maximize their information set. However, this is highly unrealistic: managers have limited and heterogeneous resources and skills to manage complex organizations. Indeed, the diversification literature has shown that conglomerate performance tends to decrease as the number of segments increase, especially if the segments are unrelated (Rumelt, 1974; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Fan and Lang, 2000; Villalonga, 2004; and others) . Our paper is the first to suggest and empirically test that a trade-off exists between increasing the information set of the company through excess centrality and losing focus and attention through diversification. Moreover, our empirical analysis reveals that the excess centrality effect is in general as robust and economically significant as the variables measuring focus (number of segments) and relatedness (number of related segments). A second reason why not all firms maximize informational advantages is that organizations face heterogeneous corporate governance and agency problems, and therefore the extent to which a firm maximizes shareholder value also differs across firms. Some managers may be maximizing their own personal welfare, one of the motivating arguments underpinning the diversification discount literature. If this is the case, then some conglomerates will diversify more according with the personal preferences of their CEOs rather than due to shareholder value maximization. Last but not the least, a conglomerate's excess centrality at any point in time is partly a product of a long sequence of idiosyncratic shocks the firm was exposed to in the past, even if the firm is maximizing shareholder value. For example, some mergers are successful, while others are not. The realizations of such random variables affect a conglomerate's network position over time and, therefore, excess centrality.
In our main results, we show how informational competitive advantage leads to better economic performance. We also uncover two potential mechanisms mediating the relationship between informational advantage and value creation. First, using the approach in Seru (2010) to measure innovation, we find that high-excess-conglomerates produce more patents: a one-standard-deviation increase in excess centrality leads to an increase of approximately 20% in patent production for the average conglomerate (ca. 2 extra patents per year). Sec-ond, we measure the "investment distortion" of conglomerates, following Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) , and we find that conglomerates with higher excess centrality have lower distortions. This is consistent with the notion that better informed and more innovative conglomerates have more to gain from investing efficiently.
We provide a series of robustness checks on our results. According to our hypothesis, if some conglomerates have an informational competitive advantage over specialized firms, we should observe a larger presence of conglomerates, relative to specialized firms, in instances where conglomerates have higher excess centrality. We find that excess centrality is indeed an important determinant of industry composition: high-excess-centrality conglomerates face on average lower competition from specialized firms. We also check whether the effect of excess centrality on excess value is greater in specific industries, and we find that excess centrality is more effective in creating value in industries where soft information is important (using the proxy of Santalo and Becerra, 2008) . This result is consistent with the notion that excess centrality is a proxy for the quantity of soft information available to a conglomerate. Finally, we perform additional robustness checks using various alternative specifications of our main result.
6
Our novel measurement of excess centrality in a network of industries contributes to a growing literature on the economic role of information diffusion across networks. We build from the empirical literature that studies the economic returns associated with a network position (e.g., Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992 Burt, , 2004 .
7 Three recent examples of such an approach in finance are Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007 ), Fracassi (2009 ), and Ozsoylev, Walden, Yavuz, and Bildik (2011 . 8 We also make a contribution in understanding the trade-off that conglomerates face when they diversify across industries, since prior literature mostly focused on the effects of focus and relatedness. Our paper studies the critical role that informational competitive advantage plays in diversification. Finally, our paper contributes to the merger literature, presenting evidence that mergers associated with an increase of excess centrality create value.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an example which illustrates the conceptual framework underpinning our empirical approach. Section 3 constructs the empirical industry network and the measure of conglomerate excess centrality. Section 4 contains the main results on the relationship between excess centrality and economic performance. Section 5 provides evidence for two potential mechanisms mediating the relationship between excess centrality and value creation. In section 6 we conduct some robustness checks of our main result. Section 7 concludes. An appendix contains variable definitions. Additional tables of robustness checks mentioned in the text are included in an online appendix, available from the authors' websites.
Excess centrality as a measure of informational advantage
In this section we develop the conceptual framework that underlies our empirical approach. First we define industry centrality and why we view it as a proxy for the variation in informational competitive advantage across industries. Next we define conglomerate centrality and excess centrality, which generalizes the industry-level framework to conglomerates.
Industry centrality
Consider an economy with 6 distinct sectors, interconnected in the way depicted in figure  1 . The links in figure 1 represent customer-supplier interactions between sectors. The existence of links between sectors is mainly driven by technological factors, and only partly by considerations related to information acquisition. Therefore, the structure of the network of industries may partly explain firm performance, to the extent that the positioning of certain sectors makes them "informationally rich" (industry 3 in figure 1 , for example). For this information to be relevant in terms of economic performance, there must be some gain in combining information coming from distinct industries. This is the case if for example the level of technological specialization compromises the ability of firms to innovate based on just their experience; knowing about "uncorrelated" ideas could then be a source of higher economic performance (Burt, 2004) . (some) value for all other industries. Thus, everything else constant, firms that receive a higher number of information bits will perform better. Further assume that firms in industry i learn about the information bit in industry j according to the following mechanism: (i) the shortest path between i and j is identified; 10 (ii) the firm has some limited resource which may be used to try to retrieve the information bit (only once); and (iii) the probability that a firm successfully retrieves the information bit is given by δ l ij , where δ ∈ [0, 1] is a decay factor and l ij is the length of the shortest path between industries i and j. 11 The expected total number of information bits retrieved by specialized firms is computed easily as shown in Panel A of table 1 and in the left panel of figure 2.
[ Table 1 about here] Firms in industry 3 are more central, and therefore have the highest expected number of information bits, for any δ. Industry 5 is the second most central and, correspondingly, has the second highest number of information bits. Industry 6 is the least central and so has the least number of information bits. A standard network statistic that captures the notion of one single industry receiving a higher quantity of information is closeness centrality, defined as
where N is the number of nodes in the network.
12
10 If multiple shortest paths exist, the firm picks one at random. 11 This approach is standard in the game-theoretic economic networks literature when representing the benefit of a tie at a certain distance; see for example Jackson and Wolinski (1996) or Bala and Goyal (2000) . For models where the flow of information across a network is modeled explicitly, see Reagans and Zuckerman (2008) and Anjos and Reagans (2010) . For an advanced textbook overview of social and economic networks' literature, see Jackson (2008) .
12 For a reference about standard network statistics see for example Jackson (2008) . 
Conglomerate centrality and excess centrality
The notion that firms may derive competitive advantages from operating in industries that are strategically located (within the overall industry network) is both intuitively and theoretically appealing. Unfortunately, testing empirically the relationship between performance and industry-level informational competitive advantage is very difficult, since many other variables contribute to both the industry performance and the structure of the network. For example, more central industries could be more exposed to aggregate economic shocks and command higher risk premia. These higher risk premia will presumably affect valuation ratios directly and perhaps even equilibrium industry structure. Alternatively, more mature industries tend to be larger and more central, but simultaneously command smaller valuation ratios due to relatively low expected future growth.
Given the endogeneity concerns due to omitted and noisy variables, we adopt an identification strategy that exploits the informational advantage of conglomerates relative to a portfolio of specialized firms. We assume that conglomerates can frictionlessly exchange information bits across segments where they are present, and therefore they have an informational advantage over single-segment firms. Such identification strategy allows us to control for industry-specific effects, and focus on the centrality of the conglomerate in excess of what specialized firms in the same industries already have.
In this section we extend the definitions of informational advantage and centrality to conglomerates. We assume the following mechanism of information diffusion: (i) in order to retrieve the information bit from industry k, the conglomerate uses its subsidiary that is closest to k; (ii) the conglomerate has some limited resource which may be used to try to retrieve the information bit only once; (iii) the decay factor is given by δ ∈ [0, 1] as for specialized firms; and the distance of a conglomerate to a participated industry is defined to be zero. Thus, the probability that a conglomerate participating in industries i and j successfully retrieves the information bit from industry k is given by
For illustration purposes, let us consider three conglomerates that each participate equally in two industries: C 6,5 , C 6,3 , and C 6,1 (see figure 1 ). Panel B of table 1 shows the total expected number of information bits received by each conglomerate, as well as the (average) increase relative to a comparable portfolio of two single-segment firms. This simple example illustrates several key concepts. First, conglomerate C 6,5 has a bigger informational advantage relative to specialized firms-i.e. excess number of information bits-than conglomerate C 6,1 (see right panel of figure 2), despite the fact that industry 5 is more central and receives more information bits than industry 1 (see left panel of figure 2 ). The reason is that conglomerate C 6,1 combines non-redundant segments: the neighborhood of industry 1 does not overlap with the neighborhood of industry 6; the opposite is the case for the pair of industries (5, 6). This mechanism suggests that we should expect to see an association between segment distance and excess information. However, conglomerate C 6,3 does better relative to specialized firms than conglomerate C 6,1 (see right panel of figure 2), although it mixes segments that are relatively closer. This shows that maximizing segment distance and maximizing informational advantage are in general not equivalent. In a conglomerate, segments are both suppliers and consumers of information, and it may be optimal to have one (highly central) segment generate a large amount of information, to be consumed by the more peripheral segments. According to this argument, conglomerates add value by leveraging the informational capital that occurs naturally in central industries. Now we can define formally centrality at the conglomerate level for a generic network, in light of the information advantages and diffusion mechanisms we just elaborated upon. Denoting the set of participated industries of a conglomerate by I, we define a conglomerate's centrality as
where N is still the total number of industries in the economy. We compute the distance of the conglomerate to industry j by considering the participated segment i that is closest to j. Assuming that information flows frictionlessly within the conglomerate, it follows that the informational advantage of a conglomerate present in industry i, relative to specialized firms in the same industry, is
where as before CC i is the closeness centrality of industry i. Integrating over all of the conglomerate's segments, the conglomerate's total (or average) informational advantage is then proxied by what we term excess centrality (EC):
where w i is the asset weight for industry i' subsidiary. Applying the definition of excess centrality to our previous example, we find that C 6,3 is the conglomerate with the highest excess centrality (at 0.88), followed by C 6,1 (at 0.54), and lastly by C 6,5 (at 0.34). This ranking is the same as the one using excess information bits (see Panel B of table 1 and right panel of figure 2).
Construction of network variables
We use as our main industry classification the 6-digit Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) industry code.
13 The 6-digit BEA industry code defines 470 industries, and therefore it has the same level of aggregation as the 4-digit SIC code. We use such classification, rather than more conventional classifications such as SIC or NAICS, because the Input-Output Tables reporting the flow of goods and services between industries come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Detailed Input-Output tables are prepared by the BEA every 5 years. We decided to use 1997, the midpoint of our data period, because these flows are highly persistent (see the online appendix) and, in addition, industries are reclassified over time.
We first construct a network of industry flows, where each pair of industries is linked together by the intensity of the dollar amount of commodity flow. The industry network is a weighted graph.
14 The "use tables" report a dollar flow from commodity i to industry j; 15 we denote this flow by f ij . Similarly to Ahern and Harford (2010) , we generate four 13 For robustness, we replicated our study using the 3-and 4-digit industry codes, with very similar results (available in the online appendix).
14 Binary networks do not exploit information that we believe is relevant (namely information transmission being more likely for stronger ties), and also they require the definition of a somewhat arbitrary threshold for the link strength after which a tie is classified to exist.
15 BEA assigns to each industry a unique primary commodity; that generates a square matrix of intermediate uses (codes are the same for industries and commodities). Tables Industry Classifi- cation system level. Solid red (dashed black) circles represent the top (bottom) 5 industries in the centrality ranking (labels available in the online appendix). For visualization purposes, we use unweighted links. The unweighted industry network was constructed by setting the threshold for which a link exists at the maximum level such that the network is still fully connected.
alternative (normalized) measures of link strength between i and j:
Our tie strength measure is the simple average of the above, so by construction it is undirected; we denote such average flow by f * ij . Next we define an adjacent distance measure for an industry pair, by taking the inverse of the average flow:
Figure 3 illustrates the industry network using the 3-digit Input-Output Tables Industry Classification system level, as well as the top 5 and bottom 5 industries in the centrality ranking. For visualization purposes, we use unweighted links.
16
Next we compute the weighted shortest path (one can think of distance as a cost) between any two industries by determining the total distance of the optimal path (i.e. the one that minimizes total distance or cost).
17 Denoting these distances for industry pairs as l ij , we can now compute centrality for any industry as in equation (1), as well as conglomerate excess centrality using formula (5).
Excess centrality and economic performance
We investigate how the informational competitive advantage of high-excess-centrality conglomerates impacts their economic performance. We expect (i) conglomerates with high excess centrality to have a valuation premium and be more profitable, relative to conglomerates with low excess centrality; and (ii) firms that acquire target companies in industries that increase their excess centrality to experience a higher merger announcement abnormal return.
Excess value analysis
In this section we investigate the relationship between a conglomerate's excess centrality and its excess value, the industry-adjusted conglomerate's Tobin's Q. Such identification strategy allows us to control for any industry characteristics and shocks that affect both specialized firms and conglomerates. We use COMPUSTAT Segment for segments' data, COMPUSTAT for accounting data, and CRSP for stock prices and market values. The key dependent variables in our empirical analysis is excess value, which is computed as in studies about the diversification discount (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Villalonga, 2004; Santalo and Becerra, 2008; Custódio, 2009 ): we take the log-difference of the conglomerate's Tobin's Q with respect to the average Tobin's Q of a similar portfolio of specialized firms (the "artificial conglomerate"). We use the asset weights of the conglomerate's segments in computing the Tobin's Q of its artificial counterpart.
18 We exclude conglomerates whose main segment (i.e. the one with largest asset weight) belongs to the financial industry. COMPUSTAT Segment reports the NAICS code of each segment, and BEA provides a mapping between these NAICS codes and the 6-digit Input-Output Codes. Panels A and B of table 2 present firm-level summary statistics regarding the data we used for the excess value analysis.
19 Consistent with papers about the diversification discount, the 17 These network measures were computed using MATLAB BGL routines (available at http://www.mathworks.nl/matlabcentral/fileexchange/10922), namely the dijkstra algorithm for minimal travel costs.
18 Similarly to other papers computing excess value, we exclude observations where there is a divergence of 5% or more in terms of the total assets reported by COMPUSTAT Segment, relative to COMPUSTAT.
19 A table in the online appendix shows the top and bottom five industries in terms of centrality. average conglomerate's excess value is negative, the median conglomerate has two unrelated segments, and conglomerates are larger than single-segment firms, with lower Tobin's Q and higher profitability.
[ Table 2 about here] Table 3 presents the OLS regression coefficients of of conglomerate excess value (industryadjusted Tobin's Q) of each conglomerate on excess centrality-the proxy for informational competitive advantage-and other control variables. As mentioned before, the advantage of our identification strategy is that we control for industry characteristics by computing excess centrality and excess value relative to specialized firms in the same industry. We control for time-series correlation of the error term by clustering the standard errors at the conglomerate level. All specifications include year fixed effects to control for macroeconomic shocks to the variables.
Specification (1) shows that there is a univariate main effect of excess centrality on value: on average, conglomerates with higher excess centrality also have higher industry-adjusted value. Specification (2) controls for the main determinants of conglomerate excess performance, namely the number of segments in the conglomerate, and the number of related segments, following Berger and Ofek (1995) .
20 However, the excess centrality coefficient is still positive and significant. Consistent with prior literature, we find that the higher the number of segments and the more diverse the segments are, the lower is the value of the conglomerate. This result highlights the trade-off that conglomerates face when they diversify: on the one hand, diversification increases the information set; on the other hand, managers have limited resources and skills, and excess diversification limits managers' attention focus. The beta coefficient of excess centrality is higher than the coefficient of related segments, indicating that informational advantage has a greater effect on value than the loss of focus of expanding into unrelated segments. A one-standard-deviation increase in excess centrality translates into an increase of around 0.07 standard deviations in excess value. This corresponds roughly to 3% of firm value in our sample, 21 representing 20% of the diversification discount in Berger and Ofek (1995) . Specification (3) includes other control variables used by Berger and Ofek (1995) and Santalo and Becerra (2008) , to control for size, current profitability, and growth opportunities. The coefficients of these control variables are similar 20 The number of related segments is defined as the difference between the number of segments using the 3-digit Input-Output industry classification, and the number of segments using the 6-digit classification.
21 Standard deviation of excess value at the 6-digit level is approx. 0.66, while the average market-to-book ratio is around 1.64. to what has been found in the literature. However, our measure of excess centrality is still positive and statistically significant.
Even if we control for industry characteristics, we could still be concerned that unspecified differences among conglomerates could both drive excess centrality and excess value. Therefore in specification (4) we add conglomerate fixed effects. The coefficient of excess centrality is very similar to the previous specifications, both economically and statistically. This result is particularly important because it shows that a conglomerate's increase in excess centrality, driven by changes in its industry portfolio, 22 still generates a similar increase to the conglomerate's value.
[ Table 3 about here]
Excess profitability and excess centrality
Previous research has shown that investors process information regarding conglomerates and specialized firms in different ways (Zuckerman, 1999; Cohen and Lou, 2010) . We might therefore be concerned that our excess value results could be driven by investors' heterogeneous ability to process complex information. In addition, we could be concerned that our measure of Tobin's Q is noisy and biased. In order to address these issues, we study the effect of excess centrality on return on assets (ROA). Accounting profitability is not affected by investors' ability, and can be precisely measured. Table 4 presents the OLS coefficients of regressing the industry-adjusted (or excess) ROA on excess centrality; to control for correlation in the error terms, we cluster standard errors at the conglomerate level. Similar to excess value, excess ROA is defined as the difference of the conglomerate's ROA with respect to the average ROA of a similar portfolio of specialized firms. We use the asset weights of the conglomerate's segments in computing the ROA of its artificial counterpart.
[ Table 4 about here]
We use a specification with conglomerate fixed effects, because we want to control for time-invariant omitted variables and we want to know how long it takes for conglomerates to process this informational advantage and increase profit. Specifications (1) and (2) show that there is no relation between excess centrality and excess ROA contemporaneously or when explanatory variables are lagged one period. However, with a lag of two periods, excess centrality is shown to positively affect future ROA (specification (3)). Incidentally, this is also true for the two other determinants of conglomerate performance (number of segments and number of related segments), which also exhibit the expected signs. This result informs us that it takes time, at least 2 years, for conglomerates to process such informational advantages and generate excess profitability. Specification (4) shows that this effect remains after controlling for firm-level financial characteristics. Specification (5) indicates that the excess centrality effect is still present with a lag of 3 and with a similar economic magnitude as specifications (3) and (4). The lower number of observations might explain the lower statistical significance of specification (5) and perhaps also the lack of statistical significance in specification (6) .
Merger analysis
In the previous two sections we showed that changes in a firm's informational competitive advantage, proxied by excess centrality, are correlated with changes in firm value and future profitability. However, even after controlling for firm fixed effects, time-varying omitted variables could still bias our results. To address this issue, we investigate the stock price reaction upon announcement of a merger that changes the excess centrality of an acquirer. In the previous two sections we looked at changes of excess centrality over one calendar year. Here, we study the value effect of a merger announcement in a three day window centered around the announcement date. Thus, the timing of the excess centrality shock is defined more sharply. In addition, the merger sample is non-redundant, because we also observe specialized firms becoming conglomerates. We construct our dataset by combing information on mergers from SDC with company information from COMPUSTAT and returns data from CRSP. As is standard in the merger announcement literature, we keep all completed mergers involving US targets for which there is a return for the acquirer and the target represents at least 1% of the acquirer. We include all mergers that impact excess centrality, which corresponds to all mergers except those undertaken by specialized firms within their current industry. Finally, we exclude repurchases, spin offs, recapitalizations, acquisitions of remaining interest, self tenders, privatizations, minority stake purchases, exchange offers, and leveraged buyouts. Panel C in table 2 shows summary statistics. In our data, acquirers on average experience a positive abnormal return upon announcement of a merger.
23 The majority of the mergers are paid in cash, are friendly, 23 The literature indicates that accquirers' abnormal returns tend to be zero or slightly negative (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001 ). However, we note that our merger sample is biased in that we exclude horizontal mergers conducted by specialized firms; this may possibly be the reason why our average acquirer and target private companies.
We find that mergers that increase excess centrality experience a higher cumulative abnormal return. Specifications (1), (3), and (5) of table 5 show the coefficients of the univariate ordinary-least-squares regressions of cumulative abnormal returns on changes in excess centrality, for a window of [−1, 1], [−2, 2], and [−3, 3] days centered around the announcement of a merger, respectively. On average, firms that increase their excess centrality through an acquisition experience a positive stock price return relative to the CRSP value-weighted index market return. Following the mergers' literature, in specifications (2), (4), and (6) we add control variables that affect announcement returns. Consistent with the literature, we find that bigger deals destroy more value, and that deals where the target is larger relative to the acquirer create more value. We also find that friendly mergers and mergers where the target is a private company create more value for the acquirer. However, even after controlling for these control variables, mergers with higher excess centrality create more value for the acquirer.
[ Table 5 about here]
Two potential mechanisms
In the previous section we have shown evidence tying a conglomerate's knowledge advantagemeasured by excess centrality-to its ability to create value (Tobin's Q and profitability). As explained in the introduction, our main hypothesis builds on previous ideas from the management and networks' literatures, which suggest that access to a broad knowledge base regarding managerial and technological processes helps companies innovate and create value. This section shows some evidence of potential mechanisms mediating the relationship between knowledge access and value creation.
Excess centrality and patent production
A firm's innovative ability, broadly considered, refers to any change in organizational processes that confers the firm a greater competitive advantage. For highly technological industries a significant portion of innovation is prone to measurement, since patent production is observed. For other industries, however, the measurement of innovation is problematic. For example, if a firm adopts an Enterprise Resource Planning system such as SAP after learning about the benefits of such a system via interaction with a supplier who was an return is positive.
early adopter, then according to the conceptual framework underpinning our analysis this would correspond to a shock to "innovation"; a shock that we argue on average creates value. Unfortunately, data on this type of event is not readily available, and many such types of events occur frequently in firms: changes in governance policies, marketing strategies, product design, manufacturing processes, etc. all fall within the broad concept of innovation that is appropriate for our perspective.
The above-mentioned limitation notwithstanding, we conducted an analysis relating excess centrality to an observable innovation output, namely patent production. This proxy for R&D productivity is the one used in Seru (2010) , a paper studying the innovation performance of diversified firms. As in Seru (2010) , our main variable of interest is the number of patent applications by a firm in a given year, which we collect from the NBER patent dataset for the period 1990-2006. 24 In keeping with our previous approaches in the measurement of relative conglomerate performance, we construct a variable termed "excess patents" which corresponds to the asset-scaled difference between the number of patents produced by a conglomerate, relative to a comparable portfolio of single-segment firms. We then perform OLS regressions of the excess patents' variable on excess centrality and other control variables; table 6 reports the results.
[ Table 6 about here] Specification (1) shows that excess centrality correlates positively with the excess number of patents at the univariate level, and this result is robust to including other conglomerate characteristics (specifications (2) and (3)). The results are economically significant: a onestandard-deviation increase in excess centrality corresponds to approximately 20% more patent production for the average conglomerate (about 2 patents per year). 25 We note that although high-excess-centrality conglomerates do seem to innovate more, it is not the purpose of our analysis to make a statement regarding the innovation performance of the average conglomerate, relative to specialized firms; and indeed, the average and median excess innovation in our sample are negative (see table 2), which is consistent with the findings in Seru (2010) . 24 The website for this dataset can be found at "http://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home". This dataset has data only up to 2006.
25 According to specification (3), a one-standard-deviation increase in excess centrality leads to an increase of 0.044 × 0.01 in the excess number of asset-scaled patents. The average number of asset-scaled patents in our sample is 0.0025, so in relative terms this corresponds to 0.00044/0.0025 = 18%. If one takes specification (2), the beta coefficient on excess centrality is 0.065 instead of 0.044, so the increase jumps to 26%. Finally, in our sample the average conglomerate produces around 11 patents per year.
Investment distortions
Our excess profitability analysis revealed that informational advantages take on average two years to become visible in terms of cash flows. This suggests that investment policy could be one of the channels through which conglomerates use information from the network to create value (vs. for example a higher effectiveness in short-run marketing initiatives). In this section we show further evidence that investment is indeed a relevant channel. We follow the approach in Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) closely. In this paper, the authors theorize that power struggles can lead to (ex-post) inefficient investment decisions in a conglomerate. Their model produces sharp testable implications in terms of the "investment distortion" in a conglomerate, relative to specialized firms, and the empirical evidence corroborates the theory. We argue that investment distortions should be smaller for highexcess-centrality conglomerates, since these conglomerates have more to gain from correct investment decisions (relative to less-informed conglomerates).
We thus follow Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) and define investment distortion as the absolute value of the relative value added by allocation using industry-and firm-adjusted investment ratios:
where I j is the capital expenditure of segment j, BA j the book value of assets of segment j, I ss j BA ss j the asset-weighted average capital-expenditure-to-assets ratio for the single-segment firms in the corresponding industry, and w j the ratio of segment assets to firm assets. We conduct the analysis also at lower levels of detail in industry classification (3-and 4-digit IO-code), because lower levels of detail reduce the noise in the investment distortion variable. Table 7 shows the results of OLS regression of investment distortion on excess centrality and control variables.
[ Table 7 about here] Specifications (1) and (2) use the 3-digit BEA Input-Output classification system, specifications (3) and (4) the 4-digit one, and finally specifications (5) and (6) use the 6-digit classification. The negative coefficient of excess centrality (in all specifications) indicates that high-excess-centrality conglomerates display lower investment distortions, as we expected. A one-standard-deviation increase in increase in excess centrality corresponds to a decrease of approximately 8% in investment distortion, relative to the mean; and this is consistent across specifications. 26 The number of segments variable is positively correlated to investment distortion, and surprisingly the related segments variable is negatively correlated with investment distortion.
6 Robustness checks
Controlling for distance between segments
Although as explained in section 2 maximizing excess centrality and maximizing segment distance are in general not equivalent problems, it turns out that there is a positive statistical association between these two variables (correlation in data is approx. 0.35, according to our definition of distance below). This occurs because for segments that are very close in the industry network it is always true that a conglomerate exhibits low excess centrality. Given the correlation between these two variables, it is important that we distinguish our story from arguments that would generate a positive association between segment distance and conglomerate value. On one hand conglomerates that participate in more distant segments may experience larger coinsurance effects from business diversification, which could presumably lead to higher debt capacity and concomitant tax shields. On the other hand there could be selection issues. Ahern and Harford (2010) show that inter-industry mergers tend to happen between firms that are relatively close (in a network sense) and these mergers could be of a very different kind than the less frequent event of a distant merger. Indeed, the occurrence of distant mergers could be picking up unobserved conglomerate heterogeneity that is time-varying (and thus not controlled by firm fixed effects). For example, conglomerates that are better able to value potential targets and synergies from merger deals will engage in acquiring targets that are "further away", in a network sense, since they are less exposed to adverse selection issues. To address the above concerns we construct a measure for the average distance between segments in a conglomerate:
where as before I denotes the set of participated industries, M is the size of this set, and l ij is the length of the shortest path between industries i and j. In short, our measure for segment distance is the average distance between any two industries the conglomerate participates in. Table 8 shows that our results are very similar, both economically and statistically, after including segment distance as an additional control variable in our main regressions. Interestingly the coefficient on segment distance is positive, in line with the hypotheses on coinsurance effects and conglomerate ability mentioned above.
[ Table 8 about here]
Industry composition analysis
In previous sections we have shown that conglomerates can use their competitive position in the network of industries to create value. In the long run, if some conglomerates persistently have a competitive informational advantage over specialized firms, we should observe a larger presence of conglomerates, relative to specialized firms, in industries where conglomerates have higher excess centrality. Our approach follows closely Santalo and Becerra (2008) , who claim that industry composition should be a "sufficient statistic" for the performance difference between conglomerates and specialized firms. The argument is that industries with certain characteristics (e.g., importance of soft information) give conglomerates a natural advantage, which presumably limits the number of specialized firms that are able to remain competitive. The authors thus find that industries where conglomerates have a higher excess value also exhibit a lower participation of specialized firms. However, Santalo and Becerra (2008) do not measure nor test what the source of such competitive advantage is. The authors conjecture that such competitive advantage is a function of the importance of soft information, i.e. information which cannot be credibly conveyed to outsiders, such as external capital markets (Stein, 2002; Faure-Grimaud, Laffont, and Martimort, 2003) . The importance of soft information has been suggested as a potential source of conglomerate advantage, via internal capital markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Servaes, 1996) . Our measure of excess centrality is aptly interpreted as a proxy for the quantity of soft information available to a conglomerate, relative to its specialized counterparts. In order to test the hypothesis that high-excess-centrality conglomerates have an informational competitive advantage, we follow Santalo and Becerra (2008) in computing the average intensity of competition (market share) that a conglomerate faces from specialized firms. This measure is obtained by first computing the market share of specialized firms for each industry; and second by creating a conglomerate-level version of this variable. The OLS regression analysis uses the same right-hand-side variables as table 3; results are presented in table 9.
[ Table 9 about here] Specification (1) shows a strong negative association between excess centrality and the intensity of competition the focal conglomerate faces from specialized firms. Consistent with our hypothesis, if conglomerates have higher excess centrality in an industry, specialized firms in the same industry have lower market share. However, this effect could be overstated if excess centrality is correlated with other determinants of conglomerate competitive advantage. Specification (2) controls also for the number of total and related segments of the conglomerate, and in specification (3) we also add financial characteristics' variables. Even after controlling for other control variables, excess centrality is still negatively and significantly correlated with the market share of the specialized firms: according to specification (3), a one-standard-deviation increase in excess centrality leads approximately to 9% less market share of single-segment competitors, relative to the mean.
28 Finally, specification (4) adds firm fixed effects to the regression of specification (3); as we expected, changes in industry composition are long-run processes that do not occur instantly, so even if we do find a coefficient on excess centrality that is negative, it is not statistically significant.
Industry characteristics and relative conglomerate performance
One possible explanation for our findings is that excess centrality is simply correlated with unobserved heterogeneity in industry characteristics that naturally give conglomerates a competitive advantage. Even if we already controlled for conglomerate fixed effects in specification (4) of table 3, one could argue that conglomerates respond to changes in industry characteristics with strategic diversifications. This time-varying omitted-variables problem could make our results spurious. To address this issue, once more we use the approach from Santalo and Becerra (2008) , where the relative presence of specialized firms in an industry is taken to be a "sufficient statistic" for whether conglomerates have a natural advantage. We include this variable in our excess value regressions and observe whether the excess centrality effects disappears. We note that this is a priori a relatively strong test of how robust the excess centrality effect is, since we are regressing a measure of conglomerate advantage (excess value) on another measure of conglomerate advantage (industry composition). Results are presented in table 10.
[ Table 10 about here] Specification (1) includes the market share of specialized firms in addition to the other variables that drive excess value; the coefficient of excess centrality remains statistically significant, and the magnitude of the coefficient is almost unchanged relative to specification (2) in table 3. Specification (2) adds financial characteristics' variables, and results are practically unchanged. The same is true if we add firm fixed effects (specification (3)). The results obtained in these three specifications show that excess centrality does not correlate with unobserved heterogeneity in industry characteristics that determine the success of conglomerates relative to specialized firms.
Specifications (4)- (6) in table 10 add an interaction term of excess centrality and the market share of specialized firms to specifications (1)-(3). If one of the industry characteristics that determines the natural advantage of conglomerates is the importance of soft information, then one should expect the access to more information (via excess centrality) to be particularly important in these industries. Assuming the proxy from Santalo and Becerra (2008) captures the extent to which soft information is important, then an interaction term with excess centrality should have a negative coefficient. In all three specifications ( (3)- (6)), the interaction term in negative and statistically significant.
Alternative specifications for excess value analysis
We performed additional robustness checks of our main results and in all cases the qualitative results are similar. In particular, the results do not change much, both economically and statistically, if we replace our main specification from table 3 to include the goodwill adjustment proposed in Custódio (2009) or if we employ the 5-company cutoff rule for the computation of the artificial conglomerate's Q.
29 Finally, the results are also robust if we use lower levels of detail in terms of industry classification or if we use an equal-weighted measure of excess centrality. The regression outputs for the alternative specifications are available in the online appendix.
Conclusion
This paper develops and test the hypothesis that firms who are more central in the industry network achieve higher economic performance, by combining knowledge and information from disparate sources. We employ a clear identification strategy that allows us to separate 29 The 5-company cutoff rule, employed by Berger and Ofek (1995) , Fan and Lang (2000) , and Custódio (2009) (amongst others) specifies that for those segments where the conglomerate operates where there are less than 5 specialized firms, the analysis is taken up one level (in these studies, in terms of SIC). Like in Santalo and Becerra (2008) , we believe in our case it is conceptually more correct to not employ this rule, since the excess centrality measures could potentially change in important ways (recall that these hinge critically on the definition of industries and their flows).
out the role of industry links from other unobservable industry characteristics. Using singlesegment firms as benchmarks, we find that conglomerates that possess a greater informational advantage display higher valuations, higher profitability, and higher abnormal returns upon announcement of a merger that increases their excess centrality. Furthermore, we uncover two potential mechanisms, innovation production and investment distortions, that mediate the relationship between informational advantage and value creation. Finally, we perform extensive robustness checks to rule out alternative explanations for our findings. Our paper adds to the finance literature by proposing and empirically validating a novel informationbased channel of value creation.
APPENDIX -Variable Definitions
• Acquirer Market Value: The value of the acquirer's equity four days before the merger announcement (Source: CRSP).
• Capital Expenditures (CAPEX): Funds used for additions to PP&E, excluding amounts arising from acquisitions (Source: CAPEX variable in COMPUSTAT).
• Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) [-t,t] : The cumulative abnormal return of the acquirer in the 2t days surrounding the merger announcement. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as the sum of the firm's raw return minus the CRSP valueweighted market portfolio (excluding ADRs) return including all distributions over the 2t days (Source: CRSP and Authors' Calculations).
• Deal Value: The dollar value of all consideration paid in a merger minus costs and fees (Source: SDC).
• Diversifying Merger : Dummy variable equal to 1 if a merger is a diversifying merger using the 6-digit Input-Output industry classification system (Source: SDC and BEA).
• Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT): Net Sales, minus Cost of Goods Sold minus Selling, General & Administrative Expenses minus Depreciation and Amortization (Source: EBIT variable in COMPUSTAT).
• Excess Centrality: The difference between the closeness centrality of a conglomerate and the assets-weighted closeness centrality of a similar portfolio of specialized firms, using the 6-digit Input-Output industry classification system (Source: COMPUSTAT, COMPUSTAT SEGMENTS, BEA, and Authors' Calculations).
• Excess Centrality (Equally-Weighted): The difference between the closeness centrality of a conglomerate and the equally-weighted closeness centrality of a similar portfolio of specialized firms, using the 6-digit Input-Output industry classification system (Source: COMPUSTAT, COMPUSTAT SEGMENTS, BEA, and Authors' Calculations).
• Excess Patents: The difference between the asset-scaled number of patents produced by a conglomerate and the asset-scaled number of patents produced by a similar portfolio of specialized firms (constructed with conglomerate asset weights), using the 6-digit Input-Output industry classification system; the top and bottom 5% of observations were dropped due to the presence of outliers. We exclude observations where both the the conglomerate and the comparable portfolio of specialized firms have zero patents produced. (Source: CRSP, COMPUSTAT SEGMENTS, COMPUSTAT, BEA, NBER Patent Dataset, and Authors' Calculations).
• Excess Value: The log-difference between the Tobin's Q of a conglomerate and the assets-weighted Tobin's Q of a similar portfolio of specialized firms, using the 6-digit Input-Output industry classification system (Source: CRSP, COMPUSTAT, BEA, and Authors' Calculations).
• Friendly Merger Dummy: Dummy variable equal to 1 if a merger attitude is classified as friendly (Source: SDC).
• Industry Centrality: The closeness centrality of an industry, using the 6-digit InputOutput industry classification system (Source: BEA and Authors' Calculations).
• Industry Concentration: The assets-weighted average of the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index in each of the 6-digit Input-Output industries in which the conglomerate is active (Source: COMPUSTAT SEGMENTS).
• Industry Size: Aggregate sales of all public companies in Compustat Segments in each 6-digit Input-Output industry (Source: COMPUSTAT SEGMENTS).
• Investment Distortion: the absolute value of the relative value added by allocation using the industry and firm-adjusted investment ratio, as in Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) • Majority Cash Dummy: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the payment in the merger is made with at least 50% cash (Source: SDC).
• Market Share Single Segment: The assets-weighted average of the market share of specialized (Single-Segment) competitors in each of the 6-digit Input-Output industries in which the conglomerate firm is active (Source: COMPUSTAT, COMPUSTAT SEGMENTS, BEA, and Authors' Calculations).
• Number of Segments: The number of unique segments of a conglomerate using the 6-digit Input-Output industry classification system (Source: COMPUSTAT SEGMENTS and BEA).
• Related Segments: The number of unique segments of a conglomerate using the 6-digit Input-Output industry classification system, minus the number of unique segments of a conglomerate using the 3-digit Input-Output industry classification system, defined as in Berger and Ofek (1995) (Source: COMPUSTAT SEGMENTS and BEA).
• Relative Size: The ratio of the transaction value to the acquirer market equity value four days before the announcement date (Source: CRSP and SDC).
• Return on Assets (ROA): The sum of current Income Before Extraordinary Items (IB) and current Total Interest and related Expenses (XINT), divided by the value of Total Assets (AT) at the beginning of the year (Source: COMPUSTAT).
• Sales: Gross sales reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, and returned sales (Source: SALE variable in COMPUSTAT).
• Segment Distance: the distance between any two industries the conglomerate participates in, averaged across all pairs (Source: COMPUSTAT SEGMENTS, BEA, and Authors' Calculations).
• Target Public Company Dummy: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is a public company (Source: SDC).
• Tobin's Q: The sum of total assets (AT) minus the book value of equity (BE) plus the market capitalization (Stock Price at the end of the year (PRCC F) times the number of shares outstanding (CSHO)), divided by the total assets (AT) (Source: COMPUSTAT).
• Total Assets: The total assets of a company (Source: AT variable in COMPUSTAT). Table 1 : The table presents the probability of retrieving information bits as a function of the position in the network depicted in figure 1 . Panel A shows the probability that firms in sectors 1 to 6 can retrieve the information bit produced by the industries in row 1 to 6. The last row of Panel A summarizes the total amount of information bits that each sector can retrieve. Panel B shows the probability that conglomerates C 6,5 , C 6,3 , and C 6,1 can retrieve bits 1 to 6. The assets of the conglomerates are equally divided among the two sectors. The last two rows of panel B present the total bits retrieved by each conglomerate, and the difference between the bits of the conglomerates and a comparable portfolio of specialized firms in the same industries.
Panel A: Industry Information Probability of retrieval by firm in sector...
Panel B: Conglomerate Information Probability of retrieval by conglomerate... Bit C 6,5 C 6,3 Berger and Ofek (1995) . Excess Patents is the difference in the asset-scaled number of patents produced by a conglomerate, relative to a comparable portfolio of specialized firms. Excess Centrality is defined as the difference between the closeness centrality of a conglomerate and the closeness centrality of a similar portfolio of specialized firms. Related Segments is measured as the difference between the number of segments of a conglomerate using the 6-digit Input-Output industry classification system and the unique number of segments using the 3-digit Input-Output industry classification system. ∆ Excess Centrality is defined as the change in Excess Centrality before and after a merger. CAR [−t, t] is the acquirer cumulative abnormal stock return relative to the market index in the window [−t, t] centered around the announcement date of a merger. All variables are defined in detail in the appendix. Berger and Ofek (1995) . The table presents ordinary least squares regression coefficients, beta coefficients and robust T-statistics clustered at the conglomerate level. Excess Centrality is defined as the difference between the closeness centrality of a conglomerate and the closeness centrality of a similar portfolio of specialized firms. Related Segments is measured as the difference between the number of segments of a conglomerate using the 6-digit Input-Output industry classification system and the unique number of segments using the 3-digit Input-Output industry classification system. All variables are defined in detail in the appendix. A constant is included in each specification but not reported in the table. Inclusion of fixed effects is indicated at the end. Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, is indicated by *, **, and ***.
(1) Table 4 : Excess Profitability and Excess Centrality. The dependent variable is Excess Return on Assets, defined as the difference between the return on assets of a conglomerate and the return on assets of a similar portfolio of specialized firms. The table presents fixed-effect ordinary least squares regression coefficients, beta coefficients and robust T-statistics clustered at the conglomerate level. Excess Centrality is defined as the difference between the closeness centrality of a conglomerate and the closeness centrality of a similar portfolio of specialized firms. Related Segments is measured as the difference between the number of segments of a conglomerate using the 6-digit Input-Output industry classification system and the unique number of segments using the 3-digit Input-Output industry classification system. All variables are defined in detail in the appendix. A constant is included in each specification but not reported in the table. Inclusion of fixed effects is indicated at the end. Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, is indicated by *, **, and ***.
(1) Excess Patents, defined as difference between the asset-scaled number of patents produced by a conglomerate in a given year and the asset-scaled number of patents produced by a comparable portfolio of specialized firms. We exclude observations where both the benchmark and the conglomerate have zero patents produced. The table presents ordinary least squares regression coefficients, beta coefficients and robust T-statistics clustered at the conglomerate level. Excess Centrality is defined as the difference between the closeness centrality of a conglomerate and the closeness centrality of a similar portfolio of specialized firms. Related Segments is measured as the difference between the number of segments of a conglomerate using the 6-digit Input-Output industry classification system and the unique number of segments using the 3-digit Input-Output industry classification system. All variables are defined in detail in the appendix. A constant is included in each specification but not reported in the table. Inclusion of fixed effects is indicated at the end. Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, is indicated by *, **, and ***.
(1) Table 7 : Investment Distortion and Excess Centrality. The dependent variable is the investment distortion of the conglomerate, computed as the absolute value of the relative value added by allocation using the industry and firm-adjusted investment ratio as in Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) . The table presents ordinary least squares regression coefficients, beta coefficients, and robust T-statistics clustered at the conglomerate level. Specifications (1)- (2), (3)- (4), and (5)-(6) use respectively the 3,4 and 6-digit BEA industry classification system. Excess Centrality is defined as the difference between the closeness centrality of a conglomerate and the closeness centrality of a similar portfolio of specialized firms. Related Segments is measured as the difference between the number of segments of a conglomerate using the 6-digit or 4-digit Input-Output industry classification system and the unique number of segments using the 3-digit InputOutput industry classification system. All variables are defined in detail in the appendix. A constant is included in each specification but not reported in the table. Inclusion of fixed effects is indicated at the end. Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, is indicated by *, **, and ***. Berger and Ofek (1995) . The table presents ordinary least squares regression coefficients, beta coefficients and robust T-statistics clustered at the conglomerate level. Excess Centrality is defined as the difference between the closeness centrality of a conglomerate and the closeness centrality of a similar portfolio of specialized firms. Related Segments is measured as the difference between the number of segments of a conglomerate using the 6-digit Input-Output industry classification system and the unique number of segments using the 3-digit Input-Output industry classification system. Segment Distance is defined as the average level of binary distance for every possible pair of industries that the conglomerate participates in. All variables are defined in detail in the appendix. A constant is included in each specification but not reported in the table. Inclusion of fixed effects is indicated at the end. Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, is indicated by *, **, and ***.
(1) Table 9 : Industry Composition and Excess Centrality in Diversified Firms. The dependent variable is the total market share of specialized competitors averaged across all the industries where the conglomerate is present. The table presents ordinary least squares regression coefficients, beta coefficients and robust T-statistics clustered at the conglomerate level. Excess Centrality is defined as the difference between the closeness centrality of a conglomerate and the closeness centrality of a similar portfolio of specialized firms. Related Segments is measured as the difference between the number of segments of a conglomerate using the 6-digit Input-Output industry classification system and the unique number of segments using the 3-digit Input-Output industry classification system. All variables are defined in detail in the appendix. A constant is included in each specification but not reported in the table. Inclusion of fixed effects is indicated at the end. Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, is indicated by *, **, and ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4) Excess Centrality -1.623*** -1.283*** -1.252*** -0. Berger and Ofek (1995) . The table presents ordinary least squares regression coefficients, beta coefficients and robust T-statistics clustered at the conglomerate level. Excess Centrality is defined as the difference between the closeness centrality of a conglomerate and the closeness centrality of a similar portfolio of specialized firms. Market Share SS is the total market share of specialized competitors averaged across all the industries where the conglomerate is present. Related Segments is measured as the difference between the number of segments of a conglomerate using the 6-digit Input-Output industry classification system and the unique number of segments using the 3-digit Input-Output industry classification system. All variables are defined in detail in the appendix. A constant is included in each specification but not reported in the table. Inclusion of fixed effects is indicated at the end. Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, is indicated by *, **, and ***.
(1) 
